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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in tite Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH£ STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoc v 
Stat* of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
No. 99C313 
v. 
Sean Hale Holgate, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I L E D 
September 19, 2000 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable William B. Bohling 
*W< i^aer«'' J*n Grdhatct, Att'r Gen., ScQtt Keith Wilson, 
Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
John S. O'Connell, Jr., Ken.t R. Hart, Heidi Buchi, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant 
BJiS^ ftN. Associate Chief Justice: 
fl Defendant Sean Holgate was t*ied before a jury and 
convicted of murder and aggravated burgiary. Holgate argues on 
appeal that there was insufficient evic^ence to sustain a 
convection on either count. Holgate failed to raise the 
sufficiency of the evidence issue below, but argues that he 
should be entitled to raise such a claim initially on appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
32 "Dx appeal, ve review the rec>orci facts in a light most 
favoi:-abie to the jury's verdict and recite the facts 
accordingly." StatQ V. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). We 
present conflicting evidence only as neCessary to understand 
issues raised on appeal. SS& State Y. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1206 
(Utah. 1993) . 
53 On the evening of June 17, 1997, jake Gallegos, the 
victim, along with two friends, went to Holgate's apartment in 
West valley City to purchase drugs. Hoigate's friend Micah 
AI rcj—-UC. CL^KhS (it-rich £<^4 ;U 
exchange, Holgate stood directly bemnd Phillips and was 
grinning, 
<J[6 As Gallegos turned to flee into tne kitchen, Phillips 
fired the gun, fatally wounding Gallegos, Phillips then waved 
the gun back and forth in a sweeping motion, and after his gun 
apparently jammed, fled from Gallegos's apartment with Holgate. 
Holgate and Phillips ran together in a direct path across the 
apartment complex and parking lot to Phillips's vehicle, which 
was parked nearby. A friend of Phillips and Holgate, Tony 
Miller, waited in the driver's seat of the vehicle. When Holgate 
and Phillips arrived, Holgate said, "Get in, G."2 Phillips and 
Holgate then climbed into the car and were driven away from the 
apartment complex by Miller. They departed so quickly that the 
vehicle's tires squealed as they sped away, 
9(7 The police apprehended them shortly thereafter. When 
asked by the police why he thought they had been stopped, Holgate 
replied, "Because somebody talking shit got dealt with," A 
search of the car revealed the murder weapon wrapped in a 
stocking cap under the front passenger seat. Tests performed 
thereafter revealed the presence of gunpowder residue on 
Holgate's clothing- While being transported to the police 
station, Holgate asked an officer, "Does this have anything to do 
with what happened in West Valley?" Holgate testified at trial 
that he did not find oat that Gallegos had been shot until two to 
three hours after the shooting when he was interrogated at the 
police station. 
18 For his alleged participation in the killing of 
Gallegos, Holgate was charged with murder, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203, and aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-203.3 At his jury trial, Holgate alleged that he went to 
1
 Tho testified at trial that Holgate was "grinning" during 
the exchange at Gallegos's door. Holgate admitted that he might 
have grinned as he leaned against the railing outside the door. 
2
 The State presented the testimony of a child who observed 
the suspects' flight from the scene and heard the exchange 
between Holgate and Phillips as they entered the vehicle. The 
State alleged that "G" is a street term for "gangster." Holgate 
claimed that Phillips, not Holgate, said, "Get in, G." 
3
 Holgate and Phillips were each charged with murder and 
aggravated burglary for their participation in the killing of 
(Continued on next page.) 
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Vnnpon v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); £Lat<? vA 
Lopez, 896 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1995;. 
512 We have stated that "the exceptional circumstances 
exception is ill-defined and applies primarily to rare procedural 
anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). 
Holgate fails to point out any procedural anomalies cr other 
exceptional circumstances that might justify his failure to 
preserve the sufficiency of the evidence in the instant case. We 
thus turn to his claim of plain error. 
fl3 The plain error exception enables the appellate court 
to "balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands 
cf fairness." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 
1989). "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit 
us to avoid injustice." Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n.8. To 
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that 
*{i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence 
in the verdict is undermined." Hunn# 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
Stl4 As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court 
addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must 
request that the court do so. The Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure state that when a defendant moves the court to arrest 
judgment on the basis of insufficient evidence, the directive is 
mandatory in that the court "shall[] arrest judgment if the facts 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 23. In contrast, when a defendant fails to make such a 
motion, the directive is permissive, providing that the trial 
court nay arrest judgment. SfiS i£L; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 
17 (o) (*[T]he court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment . . . upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged . . . ." 
(emphasis added)); Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) ("The court may, upon 
motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party." (emphasis added)).4 
4
 Holgate impliedly contends that these rules require the 
trial court to grant relief sua sponte. However, Holgate relies 
primarily upon federal precedent that is inapposite. Rule 29(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that M[t]he 
court on motion of a defendant or of its own morion shjaJUL order 
(Continued on next page.) 
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that a remediable evidentiary defect might not be perceived ana 
corrected, thus strategically facilitating the defendant's chance 
for a reversal en appeal. £££ state v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
159 (Utah 1989). 
517 Having thus concluded that preservation is necessary as 
a general rule, we must determine under what circumstances it 
would be plain error for the trial court not to discharge a 
defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence. Section 77-17-3 
states that when the evidentiary defect is "apparent" to the 
trial court, the court ^shail" discharge the defendant. It 
necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it 
submits the case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a 
defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is apparent to 
the court. While it is difficult for the court on appeal to 
dictate when an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial 
court, there is a certain point at which an evidentiary 
insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be 
plain error for the trial court not to discharge the defendant. 
An exaxnple is the case in which the State presents na evidence to 
support an essential element of a criminal"charge. The plain 
error exception would serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such 
a case. Thus, to establish plain error, a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency 
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury.5 
II. PLAIN ERROR 
118 To determine whether there was sufficient evidence to 
convict a defendant, we do not examine whether we believe that 
the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Rather, we will conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
the evidence *is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which 
he or she was convicted." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 
(Utah 1993). If we conclude that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict Holgate, we must then, as discussed above, determine 
s
 Having concluded that the two recognized exceptions to the 
preservation rule—exceptional circumstances and plain error— 
govern a defendant's responsibility to preserve an insufficient 
evidence claim, we do not address Holgate's constitutional and 
policy-based arguments. 
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was dangerous and remained a threat, Phillips, however, did not 
"really know" Gallegos and had not been tnreatened by h m . 
(2) On the day of the shooting, Holgate telephoned 
Gallegos and informed him that he would be coming over 10 his 
apartment. Hcigate and Phillips went over to Gallegos's 
apartment: together. However, Phillips stepped aside from the 
doorway, out of view, so that only Hcigate appeared outsiae when 
Tho opened the apartment door. When Gallegos called out to Tho 
to invite Holgate into the apartment, Holgate refused and 
replied, "No. Why don't you come out here? I need to talk tc 
you real fast." As Gallegos approached the door and invited 
Holgate in, Holgate again refused to enter the apartment and 
instead stepped back with a grin on his face, allowing Phillips 
to enter the doorway and shoot Gallegos. 
(3) When asked at trial if he knew that Phillips 
brought a gun to Gallegos's apartment, Holgate initially 
responded in the affirmative, "I knew he had a gun, yes." When 
asked a second time, however, Holgate stated that he knew 
Phillips owned a gun, but did not see the gun on the day of the 
shooting. Moreover, when Holgate stepped back from Gallegos's 
doorway prior to the shooting, Phillips stepped directly in front 
of Holgate with his hands behind his back—not in his pockets, 
under his shirt, or otherwise concealed from Holgate. When 
Phillips then raised his hands from behind his back, he was 
holding the weapon. Holgate testified, however, that he did not 
see the gun even after Phillips stepped in front of him. 
(4) After the shooting, Phillips and Holgate ran down 
the stairs together, along a sidewalk, and across a parking lot 
in a relatively direct path to Phillips's car. When they arrived 
at the car, Holgate said to Phillips, "Get in, G." After the two 
young men climbed into the car, their friend Miller, who had been 
waiting in the driver's seat, immediately drove the vehicle awa^ 
from the scene. 
(5) When the car was stopped shortly after the 
shoocing, a police officer asked Holgate why he thought they were 
being stopped, and Holgate responded, "Because somebody talking 
shit got dealt with." He later added, "Does this have anything 
to do with what happened in West Valley?" However, Hcigate 
testified at trial that he did not find out that Gallegos had 
been shot until two to three hours after the shooting when he was 
interrogated at the police station. 
523 Reviewing all of the evidence, a jury could reasonably 
infer the following: 
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jury could reasonably have inferred Holgate's intent from the 
circumstances of defendant's flight in addition to N>other 
evidence of the defendant's intent . . . present in the record.'' 
ISL. 
(5) Holgate intended to kill Gallegos in retaliation 
for the threats Gallegos had made to Holgate and his family* A 
jury could reasonably make this inference on the basis of 
Holgate's statement to the police prior to his arrest that 
''somebody talking shit got dealt with." Moreover, a jury could 
interpret Holgate's statement of having "dealt with" Gallegos as 
inconsistent with his explanation at trial of not intending to 
have shot Gallegos and having no idea until two to three hours 
after the shooting whether Gallegos had actually been shot, 
5124 From these reasonable inferences and the evidence 
before the trial court, a jury could reasonably have concluded 
that Holgate intentionally or knowingly participated in the 
killing of Gallegos or intended that Phillips cause serious 
bodily injury to Gallegos, Thus, there was sufficient evidence 
to convict defendant of murder, and as a result, the trial court 
did not commit plain error in submitting the matter to the jury 
for determination. 
&• Aggravated Burglary 
125 We next consider the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting Holgate's aggravated burglary conviction. To convict 
Holgate of aggravated burglary, the State had to prove every 
statutory element of the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) 
(1999) defines the crime of burglary as follows: "A person is 
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
6
 (Footnote continued.) 
v. Jamison. No. 81,644, 2000 Kan. LEXIS 607, *10; State v. 
lli£jSfi£, 494 N.W.2d 572, 578 {Neb. 1993); State v. Maloon. 469 
A.2d 1316, 1318 (N.H. 1983); CQBffiQnvealth V. L9W1S, 419 A.2d 544, 
546-47 (Pa. Super, ct. 1980); see also l Wharton's Criminal 
Evidence S 214, at 450 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 1972) 
("Flight by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of 
the defendant, but is merely a circumstance to be considered with 
other factors as tending to show a consciousness of guilt and 
therefore guilt itself. That there is evidence which tends to 
weaken the inference of guilt implicit in flight does not render 
the evidence of flight inadmissible, but is merely to be 
considered by the jury in weighing the effect of such flight." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
11 No. 990313 
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Phillips in entering Gallegos's apartment and intended that 
Phillips commit a#felony or assault inside the apartment. Thus, 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Holgate of aggravated 
burglary, and as a result, it was not error for the trial court 
to submit the aggravated burglary charge to the jury for 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
f29 While the sufficiency of the evidence may be reviewed 
for plain error, Holgate has not demonstrated that the trial 
court plainly erred in submitting his case to the jury because he 
has failed to establish, as a threshold matter, that there was 
insufficient evidence to support either the murder charge or the 
aggravated burglary charge. We therefore affirm both of 
Holgate's convictions, 
130 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, 
and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief Justice Russon's 
opinion. 
13 No. 990313 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRAD NORTON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 990026-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Norton's conviction for witness 
tampering under Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-508? When reviewing evidence for 
sufficiency this Court should "review the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury" and 
reverse Norton's conviction if "the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Tolman, 
775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
1 
2. Whether the trial court committed plain error in refusing to sever the witness 
tampering charge from the aggravated assault charge without instructing the jury of 
their duty to decide each count individually. To establish plain error Norton must show 
"(i)[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Brad Norton appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen, after a jury trial at which Norton was convicted of 
Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, and Witness Tampering, a third degree 
felony.1 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On or about May 11, 1998, Brad Norton was charged by Information in Fourth 
District Court with: Count I~Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, in 
1This Court on Norton's motion, has previously dismissed this appeal in regards to 
Norton's aggravated assault conviction. 
2 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103;2 Count E-Evidence Tampering, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-510; Count Hi-
Witness Tampering, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-
508 (R. 9-10)3. 
On May 12 & June 3, 1998, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge 
Lynn W. Davis and Norton was bound-over on all charges and "not guilty" pleas were 
entered (R. 19-20, 47-49). 
On July 28, 1998, Norton filed a Motion to Sever Count HI (witness tampering) 
from Counts I-II on grounds that it was not part of the same criminal empisode as the 
other counts in the Information and that evidence regarding an unrelated crime or bad 
act would prejudice Norton at trial (R. 78). This issue was argued at a pre-trial 
conference on August 11, 1998, before Judge Hansen, who after deliberation, denied 
the motion (R. 92-93, 94, 122-25, 262). 
On August 18-21, 1998, a jury trial was conducted and Norton was convicted of 
Count I (aggravated assault) and Count DI (witness tampering) (R. 152-53, 155-58, 
263-66). 
2The State sought to enhance Count I with a gang enhancement pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-3-203.1. However, the trial court declined to impose the 
enhancement at sentencing (R. 249-50). 
3An Amended Information was filed on June 3, 1998 (R. 50-52). However, the 
only amendment concerned the date of offense on the witness tampering charge. 
3 
On November 30, 1998, Norton was sentenced to concurrent terms of 1-15 years 
and 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 246-47, 267). On December 28, 1998, 
Norton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court and this action 
commenced (R. 255). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A, Background 
On the night of April 10, 1998, Brad Norton, Jacqui Bingham, Bobby Garcia, 
Jordan Butler and several others became involved in a dispute between Durin Wellesly 
& Laura Vogt and Wade Willis & Heny Rivera. The two groups met at the Colony Inn 
in Provo, Utah. A fight began and Heny Rivera was beat-up and stabbed. Most of the 
individuals involved were charged with assault or aggravated assault. Brad Norton was 
tried for aggravated assault for stabbing Rivera. Norton was convicted by a jury. 
Norton was also charged with evidence tampering and witness tampering. Norton was 
acquitted by the jury of evidence tampering and convicted of witness tampering. 
B. Testimony of Jacqui Bingham 
Jacqui Bingham testified that on April 14, 1998, she was in jail because of the 
incident at the motel (R. 264 at 366-67). On the morning of the 14th, Bingham testified 
that she, Norton, Bobby Garcia and Jordan Butler were transported from the jail to the 
courthouse in Provo (R. 264 at 367). While in the transport van on the way to court, 
4 
Bingham testified that Norton told her with gritted teeth that if she testified against him 
then he would go to prison (R. 264 at 368). At court, Bingham was released on the 
charges on her own recognizance (R. 264 at 369). 
On the trip back to the jail, Bingham testified that Norton and Garcia gave her 
dirty looks outside the courthouse (Id.). In the van on the return trip, Bingham heard 
Norton and Garcia talking (R. 264 at 370). Bingham heard Norton say he was going to 
"F--k me up the asshole" and Garcia said "without vaseline so it hurts" (R. 264 at 
371). Counsel for the State asked Bingham if she considered these comments as 
constituting a threat that she would be sodomized if she testified in this case (R. 264 at 
373). Bingham responded "No... they were just trying to scare me" (R. 264 at 373). 
Bingham testified that she "kind of saw a relationship between Norton's comment that 
he would go to jail if she testified and his comment on the way back to the jail (R. 264 
at 373). 
C. Testimony of Jordan Butler 
Jordan Butler testified that he was transported from the jail to court in a big van 
with Bingham, Norton and Garcia (R. 264 at 493-94). Butler testified that he did not 
hear Norton say anything to Bingham on the way to court (R. 264 at 494). On the way 
back to the jail, Butler testified that he was sitting close to Norton and Garcia while 
Bingham sat in the front 8-10 feet away (R. 264 at 495). Butler testified that they were 
all upset (R. 264 at 496). Buder testified that Norton told him and Garcia that they 
5 
"better not get on the stand and talking all this bullshit" (R. 264 at 496-97). Butler 
testified that Norton's comments were loud enough for him to hear them and possibly 
loud enough for Bingham to hear them (R. 264 at 497). Buder also testified that he did 
not hear Norton make any comments to Bingham (Id.). Butler stated that he did not 
hear anyone on the bus say "I'm going to f—k you in the ass" (R. 264 at 513). 
D. Testimony of Bobby Garcia 
Garcia testified that he was transported from the jail to court in a big van with 
Bingham, Norton and Butler (R. 264 at 542). Garcia testified that prior to getting into 
the van, he recalled Norton saying to Bingham "Bitch, you better not testify" or words 
to that effect (R. 264 at 543). On the way back to the jail from Court, Garcia testified 
that he heard Norton threaten Bingham about testifying against him (R. 264 at 547). 
Garcia testified that Bingham was 10-15 feet from Norton when the comments were 
made (R. 264 at 557). Garcia testified that he did not hear Norton make threats of a 
sexual nature to Bingham (R. 264 at 558). 
E. Testimony of Brad Norton 
Norton testified that he was "talking smack" on the way from the jail to the 
court about people giving false testimony (R. 265 at 680-81). However, Norton denied 
making any specific comments to Bingham and or making any faces at her (R. 265 at 
683). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One, Norton asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction 
for witness tampering. 
Two, Norton asserts that the trial court committed plain error in joining the 
witness tampering charge to the aggravated assault charge without mitigating the 
prejudice of the joinder by instructing the jury as to their duty to decide each charge 
individually. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN NORTON'S 
CONVICTION OF WITNESS TAMPERING 
Along with evidence tampering and aggravated assault, Norton was charged with 
witness tampering under Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-508 for communicating threats of 
bodily injury to Jacqui Bingham in order to cause or induce her to testify falsely or to 
withhold testimony (Jury Instruction # 18(g) R. 130). Norton asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of witness tampering. When 
reviewing evidence for sufficiency this Court should "review the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury" and reverse Norton's conviction if "the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherendy improbable that reasonable minds must have 
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entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1989). 
Norton has marshaled the evidence in his Statement of Facts but does so again. 
Jacqui Bingham testified that on the way to court from jail on or about April 14, 1998, 
Norton told her that if she testified against him that he would go to prison (R. 264 at 
368). Bingham also testified that Norton and Garcia gave her dirty looks outside the 
courthouse and that on the trip back to the jail she heard Norton say he was going to 
"F--k [her] up the asshole" with Garcia adding "without vaseline so it hurts" (R. 264 at 
371). However, neither Butler nor Garcia--who were sitting next to Norton on the 
trips-heard Norton make these comments. Moreover, both Garcia and Butler testified 
that Bingham was sitting 8-15 feet away from Norton in the van (R. 264 at 495, 557). 
Garcia, however, testified that he recalled Norton say "Bitch, you better not 
testify" to Bingham prior to getting into the van and he recalled Norton making similar 
statements to Bingham on the return trip to the jail (R. 264 at 543). Garcia did not hear 
Norton make threats of a sexual nature to Bingham and he denied making any 
derogatory comments to her (R. 264 at 558). 
On the other hand, Butler testified that he did not hear Norton say anything to 
Bingham on the way to court (R. 264 at 494). Butler testified that they were all upset 
on the way back to the jail because their bail had been set so high (R. 264 at 496). 
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Butler testified that Norton told him and Garcia that they "better not get on the stand 
and talking all this bullshit" (R. 264 at 496-97). Butler testified that during these 
comments, Bingham was sitting 8-10 feet away from Norton; and that while he could 
hear Norton's comments it was only possible that Bingham could (R. 264 at 495, 497). 
Butler also testified that he did not hear Norton make any specific comments to 
Bingham nor did he hear anyone on the van say "I'm going to f~k you in the ass" (R. 
264 at 513). 
Norton admitted to "talking smack" on the van about people giving false 
testimony; however, he denied making any specific comments to Bingham (R. 265 at 
683). This "talking smack" admission is supported by Bingham's admission that she 
did not consider Norton's comments as a threat that she would be sodomized if she 
testified (R. 264 at 373) and that she only "kind of saw a relationship between 
Norton's comment that he would go to jail if she testified and his sexual innuendo on 
the way back to the jail (R. 264 at 373). 
Norton concedes that at the time the alleged witness tampering occurred, he 
knew diat an official proceeding or investigation was pending and that Bingham was 
likely to be a witness. However, Norton asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he communicated to Bingham "a threat that a reasonable person would 
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury" to her in an attempt to induce or otherwise 
9 
cause Bingham to testify falsely or to withhold testimony or information. See Jury 
Instruction #18(g) (R. 130). 
One, Norton denied making any specific comments to Bingham. Two, Bingham 
testified that she did not feel threatened by Norton's comments. Three, Norton did not 
specifically request that Bingham testify falsely or withhold testimony and Bingham 
testified that she only "kind of saw a relationship between Norton's comment that he 
would go to jail if she testified and his sexual innuendo on the way back to the jail. 
Four, the comments which Garcia testified that Norton made to Bingham were not 
supported by either Bingham or Buder's testimony. Five, neither Garcia nor Butler-
who were sitting next to Norton-heard him make comments of a sexual nature to 
Bingham. Six, the comments that Butler heard from Norton were directed more at 
himself and Garcia and consisted of statements that nobody should testify falsely. 
Norton asserts that the testimony elicited at trial was so inconclusive and 
improbable as to create reasonable doubt that he tampered with Bingham. Accordingly, 
Norton asks that this Court reverse his conviction of witness tampering because the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain it. Cf. State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 
App. 1992) (Defendant specifically told witness to testify falsely); State v. Tolman, 775 
P.2d at 424-25 (Defendant specifically told witness to withhold and destroy document). 
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POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO SEVER THE WITNESS TAMPERING CHARGE FROM THE 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE WITHOUT INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY OF THEIR DUTY TO DECIDE EACH COUNT INDIVIDUALLY 
Prior to trial, Norton filed a Motion to sever the witness tampering charge from 
the aggravated assault and evidence tampering charges on grounds that it was not part 
of the same criminal episode and that without the severance Norton would be 
prejudiced by the joinder (R. 78, 262). After argument, the trial court denied Norton's 
motion (R. 122-25). 
The trial court concluded: One, that the charges of aggravated assault and 
witness tampering were properly charged in the same information because they are 
"connected together in their commission" as provided in Utah Code Annotated § 77-8a-
l(l)(a) and State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 937 P.2d 
136 (Utah 1997) (R. 123). Two, that severance was not required because "the probative 
value of the evidence in support of each count for the other charged counts substantially 
outweighs any unfair prejudice that might result" under Rules 403 & 404(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and State v. Smith (R. 123-24). 
In Smith, this Court concluded that severance of manslaughter, failing to report a 
dead body and evidence tampering charges was not required because the charges were 
"connected together in their commission" under Utah Code Annotated § 77-8a-l(l)(a). 
927 P.2d at 653. Specifically, this Court held that "When criminal conduct resulting in 
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a second charge is precipitated by a previous charge, the two are sufficiently 'connected 
together' to allow consolidation for trial." Id. Norton concedes that under the 
parameters set forth by this Court in Smith, the charges of witness tampering and 
aggravated assault are sufficiendy connected together to allow joinder because the 
witness tampering charge was precipitated by the aggravated assault charge. 
In Smith, this Court also concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
joinder because evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in a separate 
trial under Rule 404(b) and because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any 
prejudicial tendency. 927 P.2d at 654. Norton asserts, however, that the probative 
value of all of the aggravated assault evidence did not outweigh the prejudicial effect of 
the evidence in relation to the witness tampering charge. In a separate trial, Bingham, 
Garcia and Butler could have provided a sufficient context within to place the witness 
tampering charge without prejudicing the jury on the witness tampering charge by 
providing them with all of the aggravated assault evidence. Moreover, a trial court 
"should sever charges when it concludes that 'prejudice to the defendant outweighs 
considerations of economy and practicalities of judicial administration, with doubts 
being resolved in favor of severance.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 653 (quoting State v. 
Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Smith, this Court conceded that admission of the manslaughter evidence 
would prejudice the defendant in regards to the other charges. 927 P.2d at 654. 
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However, this Court found that the trial court mitigated any prejudicial effect of joinder 
in Smith by specifically instructing the jury that they must decide each count 
individually and ensure that the State had proved every element of each charge beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id. (citations omitted). 
While the trial court in this case gave reasonable doubt instructions to the jury 
(R. 130, 131, 134-35), the trial court did not instruct the jury as to their duty to decide 
each count individually. Norton asserts that the trial court's failure to so instruct the 
jury constituted plain error which requires reversal. To establish plain error Norton 
must show "(i)[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993). 
Norton asserts that the trial court committed obvious error in failing to instruct 
the jury on their duty to decide each count individually. The trial court based its denial 
of Norton's motion to sever largely on this Court's decision in Smith. Accordingly, the 
trial court was fully apprized of the necessity to mitigate against the "natural prejudice" 
of the aggravated assault evidence. Moreover, Norton was clearly harmed by the trial 
court's error as their was no mitigation or minimization of the natural prejudice of the 
evidence. Accordingly, Norton requests that this Court reverse his conviction for 
witness tampering because the trial court committed plain error in joining the witness 
tampering charge to the aggravated assault charge without instructing the jury of their 
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duty to decide each charge individually and because Norton was prejudiced by the 
joinder without such a mitigating instruction. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Stanloy respectfully asks that this Court reverse his convictionSfbecaMfie^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this$l_ day of January, 2000. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Norton 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3/_ day of 
January, 2000. 
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ADDENDA 
CRIMINAL CODE 76-8-508-5 
False or inconsistent material statements, 
i is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any 
• He makes a false material statement under oath or 
ation or swears or affirms the truth of a material 
Bent previously made and he does not believe the 
Dent to be true; or 
|^He make's inconsistent materiaTstatements under 
I |*r affirmation, bothr within the period of limitations, 
f which is false and not believed by him to be true. 
"
f
 1997 
* False or inconsistent statements. 
\ is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
1) i t ) he makes a false statement under oath or affir-
mation or swears or affirms the truth of the state-
lit previously made and he does not believe the 
at to be true if: 
" H) the falsification occurs in an official pro-
ceeding, or is made with a purpose to mislead a 
public servant in performing his official func-
tions; or 
(ii) the statement is one which is authorized 
by law to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or 
other person authorized to administer oaths; or 
* (b) he makes inconsistent statements under oath 
1
 affirmation, both within the period of limitations, 
r of which is false and not believed by him to be 
person is not guilty under this section if the 
i is retracted before i t becomes manifest that 
ation was or would be exposed. 1997 
Written false statement. 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
makes a written false statement which he does 
to be true on or pursuant to a form bearing a 
authorized by law to the effect that false 
made therein w^ punishable; or 
intent to deceive' a public servant in the 
of his official function, he: 
Makes any written false statement which he 
not believe to be %xte; or 
Knowingly creates a false impression m a writ-
lication for any pecuniary or other benefit by 
information necessary to prevent state-
therein from being misleading; or 
Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or 
Submits or invites reliance On any sample, 
map, boundary mark, or other object which 
to be false. |f fifson shaB be guilty under this section if he 
tot falsification before it becomes manifest that 
tion was or would be exposed. 1978 
Aim or inconsistent statements — Proof of 
ty of statements — Irregularities no de-
prosecution for a violation of Subsection 76-8-
3(1 Xa), falsity of a statement may not be 
lily through contradiction by the testimony of a 
?uUons for violation of Subsection 76-8-502(2) or 
need not be alleged or proved which of the 
but only that one or the other is false and 
defendant to be true. 
<M a defense to a charge under this part that the 
*rtfe»i was administered or taken in an irregular 
1997 
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law en-
forcement officers, government agencies, or 
specified professionals. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he. 
fil) knowingly gives or causes to be given false informa-
tion to any law enforcement officer with a purpose of 
inducing the officer to heHeve that another has committed 
an offense; or _ 
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any law 
enforcement officer, any state or local government agency 
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state to 
practice social work, psychology, or marriage and family 
therapy^ information
 rconrerning the commission of an 
offense, knowing that the offense did not occur or knowing 
that n e bds no information relating to the offense or 
danger 1988 
76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer. 
A "personconmiitsra class C misdemeanor if, with intent of 
misleading a peace officer as to his identity, birth date, or place 
of residence, he knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or 
address to a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official 
duties. 1983 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation 
against witness or informant — Bribery — 
Communicating a threat . 
( D A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing 
that an offida} proceeding or investigation is pending or about 
tojbe institutea, he at&empts l^to Induce or otherwise cause a 
person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely, 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, 
item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evi-
dence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation 
to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person | s guilty of a third degree felony if he. 
(a) commits any unlawful act m retaliation for any-
thing done by another as a witness or informant; 
<b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit m 
consideration of his doing any ofthe acts specified under 
Subsection XI); or
 a 
(e) communicates to a person a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury 
to the person, because of any act performed or to be 
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. ' 1988 
- * *i 
76-8-508.5. Tampering with ju ror — Retaliation 
against juror — Penalty. 
(1) As used in this section^uror" means ^  person. 
(a) summoned for jury duty; or 
(b) serving as or having served as a juror or alternate 
juror in any court or as a juror on any grand jury of the 
state. 
(2) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if he 
attempts to or actually influences a juror in the discharge of 
the juror's service by: 
(a) communicating with the juror by any means, di-
rectly or*indirectly, except for attorneys m lawful olis-
charge of their dutiesfin open court; 
(b) offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any ben-
efit upon the juror; or 
(c) communicating to the juror a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to injure: 
(i) the jurorls person or property; or 
(n) the person or property of any other person m 
whose welfare the juror is interested. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-10-8 
P**» 
. The suspect shall have access to and may make 
fteeord and any photographs taken of him or any 
His in connection with the lineup. 1980 
CHAPTER 8a 
f IHMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES 
I )inder of offenses and of defendants. 
Joinder of offenses and of defendants . 
• or more Monies, misdemeanors, or both, may be 
»the same indictment or information if each offense 
I count and if the offenses charged are: 
on the same conduct or are otherwise con-
I together in their commission; or 
1 to have been part of a common scheme or 
When a felony and misdemeanor are charged to-
tr the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing 
ipect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 
J Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
I indictment or information if they are alleged to have 
ated in the same act or conduct or in the same 
i episode. 
> The defendants may be charged in one or more 
I together x>r ^ separately and all of the defendants 
I not be charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged 
I any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
fax its discretion on motion or otherwise orders 
Ate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
1
 The court may order two or more indictments or 
ations or both to be tried together if the offenses, 
I the defendants, if there is more than one, could have 
l Joined in a single indictment or information. 
b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecu-
i were under a single indictment or information. 
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is 
liced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an 
nent or information or by a joinder for trial to-
tr, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
ate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or 
) other relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
lisjs waived if the motion is not made at least 
i before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant 
verance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
} any statements made by the defendants which he 
i to introduce in evidence at the trial. 1990 
CHAPTER 9 
E
" UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT 
Authority of peace officer of another state. 
Procedure after arrest. 
J Authority of peace officer of this state beyond nor-
mal jurisdiction. 
„ is i 
Authority of p e a c e officer of another state . 
i officer of another state or the District of Columbia 
I this state in fresh pursuit land continues in fresh 
if a person in order to arrest him on the ground that 
onably believed to liave committed a felony in 
•te, has the same authority to arrest and hold a 
person in custody as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit 
does notrrequire instant action, but pursuit without unreason-
able delay. 1980 
77-9-2. Procedure after arrest . 
An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Section 
77-9-1 shall without unnecessary delay take the person ar-
rested before a magistrate of the county in which the arrest 
was made. The magistrate shall conduct a hearing to deter-
mine the lawfulness of the arrest. If he finds the arrest was 
lawful, the magistrate may commit the person arrested for a 
reasonable time or may admit the person to bail pending 
extradition proceedings. 1980 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of th i s state beyond 
normal jurisdict ion. 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental 
entity of this state may exercise a peace officer's authority 
beyond the limits of such officer's normal jurisdiction as 
follows: 
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose 
of arresting and holding that person in custody or return-
ing the suspect to the jurisdiction where the offense was 
committed; 
<b> When a public offense is committed in such officer's 
presence; 
(c) When participating in an investigation of criminal 
activity which originated in such officer's normal jurisdic-
tion in cooperation with the local authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another 
jurisdiction. 
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such authorized action, 
shall notify and receive approval of the local law enforcement 
authority, or if such prior contact is not reasonably possible, 
notify the local law enforcement authority as soon as reason-
ably possible. Unless specifically requested to aid a police 
officer of another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by 
law,^no legal responsibility for a police officer's action imtside 
his normal jurisdiction and as provided herein, shall attach to 
the local law enforcement authority. 1980 
CHAPTER 10 
FORMATION OF THE GRAND JURY 
(Repealed b y L a w s 1990, ch. 318, § 23.) 
77-10-1 t o 77-10-8. Repea led . 
CHAPTER 10a 
GRAND JURY REFORM 
Section 
77-10a-l. 
77-10a-2. 
77-10a-3. 
77-10a-4. 
77-10a-5. 
77-10a-6. 
77-10a-7. 
77-10a-8. 
77-10a-9. 
77-10a-10. 
Definitions. 
Panel of judges — Appointment — Member-
ship — Ordering of grand jury. 
Scope of grand jury inquiry 
Number of members — Number required for 
indictment. 
Grand jurors — Qualification and selection — 
Limits on disclosure. 
Repealed. 
Selection of grand jurors — Notice — Exami-
nation — Qualification — Alternates. 
Challenge of prospective grand jurors — Fail-
ure to comply in selection of jurors — Rem-
edies. 
Oath for grand jurors. 
Charge of grand jury — Rights and duties. 
INSTRUCTION NO, /^ (f) 
In order for you find the Defendant Brad Norton guilty of the 
offense of Count III: Witness Tampering, you must find that each of the 
following essential elements of the crime charged in the Information 
have been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. The Defendant Brad Norton 
2. On or about April 14, 1998 
3. In Utah County, Utah 
4. Communicated to a person a threat that a reasonable person 
would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to that person 
5. Because of any act performed or to be performed by the person 
in her capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or 
investigation or, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation 
was pending or about to be instituted, attempted to induce or otherwise 
cause a person to testify or inform falsely or withhold testimony or 
information. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the crime 
charged, you should find the defendant Brad Norton not guilty of this 
offense. But if the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
setforth above, then you should find the defendant Brad Norton guilty of 
the offense of Witness Tampering as charged in the Information. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHf : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
BRAD NORTON, : Case No. 981403928 FS 
Defendant(s). : Judge Steven L. Hansen 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
presiding, on l\vt Defendant's motion to sever Count III for a separate 
trial. The defendant was present, in person, and represented by Steven 
B. Killpack. The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney 
James R. Taylor. Being advised in the premises the Court makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant is charged with committing an aggravated assault 
in south Provo in the early morning hours of April 11, 1998. The State 
alleges L hal mimed Lately after the assault Norton lied b i Spanish Fork 
and participated in cleaning and hiding the assault weapon, a knife, 
within an hour of the assault. Norton was arrested the following day. 
0125 
A co-defendant Robert Garcia was also arrested over the weekend and 
placed in the Utah County Jail. Jacqui Bingham, a young woman who was 
present at the time of the assault, was also arrested and placed in the 
county jail. All three, defendant, Garcia and Bingham were transported 
together to the Fourth District Court in-Provo on Monday Morning, April 
13 to have bail set. The court imposed substantial bail upon both 
Defendant and Garcia while Ms. Bingham was released on her own 
recognizance upon recommendation of the prosecuting attorney. 
2. The State alleges that after the court hearing the three 
defendants were placed back into a van for transportation back to the 
jail. It was during that post-hearing transportation that the State 
alleges defendant and Garcia made the comments that a reasonable person 
would interpret as a threat to do bodily injury to keep her from 
informing or providing testimony against them. 
3. The allegation of the State is that defendant and Garcia 
threatened to forcibly and painfully sodomize Bingham if she testified 
against them. 
4. If established as alleged, the witness tampering offense is an 
attempt to somehow conceal the previous criminal activities of the 
Defendant. The conduct charged in the witness tampering count was 
precipitated by the Defendant's conduct in the assault charge. 
5. If the cases were to be tried separately, evidence of each 
would be admissible in the trial of the other. Evidence of the assault 
including Ms. Bingham's presence and observations and the subsequent 
arrest,, transportation and setting of bail in each other's presence 
2 
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demonstrates motive, opportunity, intent and knowledge on the charge of 
witness tampering. Evidence of the threat or attempt to make what Ms. 
Bingham knew about the assault would be admissible, HI the assault trial 
to show guilty knowledge or consciousness of guilt of the assault. 
6. Ttu assault evidence is probative and •essential evidence for 
the witness tampering charge. Indeed, without the evidence of the 
assault, including the defendant's participation and Bingham's presence 
and ubservat ion together with the subsequent arrest and transportation 
to court, together, a jury would be unable to understand that the threat 
was an attempt to conceal evidence. 
7. Inasmuch as tht evidence of each of the crimes would be 
admissible in a separate trial of the other crimes, the prejudice to the 
Defendant from having the jury hear the evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial. 
From the foregoing the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The felony charges of Aggravated Assault and Witness Tampering 
are properly charged in the same information in that they are "connected 
together in their commission" as provided in section 77-8a-l(l)(a), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and State v. Smith, *2 f I Zd 64 9 at 653 
(Utah Ap. 1996). 
2. Severance of the counts for trial is not required since the 
probative value of the evidence in support of each count for the other 
charged counts substantially outweighs any unfair prejudice that might 
3 
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result, Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and State v, 
Smith, supra. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of August, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
/ 
STEVEN B. KILLPA 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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